How Arsenal Can Beat Leicester

When league leaders Leicester City visit the Emirates Stadium on Sunday, the onus will be on Arsenal to accomplish what only one other Premier League team has done this season: Defeat the formidable Foxes.

Leicester’s story is now well-known. Nearly relegated into the Championship last season, the Midlands team hired veteran manager Claudio Ranieri and have rampaged through the league campaign to date. Thanks partly to a relatively clean injury record—Leicester have lost fewer player weeks to injury than all but one other team—and to a style that suits their personnel perfectly, the Foxes sit five points clear of Tottenham and Arsenal.

They visit London just after an impressive 3-1 away victory at Manchester City, and for Arsenal to reduce the five-point difference in the standings and energize their own push for the title, the Gunners must find a way to stop the Leicester juggernaut.

When the two sides met in September, Arsenal produced a swashbuckling 5-2 win. But a game plan that relies on outracing Leicester might not be wise here. For one thing, Arsenal haven’t been efficient recently, having failed to score in three straight league matches before notching two first-half goals against Bournemouth on Saturday. Leicester are also less generous than they were in September, with five clean sheets in their last seven matches.

There are several other approaches that could position Arsenal for victory on Sunday. Some are restrained; others, radical. This article examines some of the options available to manager Arsène Wenger and his team.

Let Leicester have the ball

Leicester have shown a preference for playing without possession. In 25 league matches, the Foxes have had more of the ball—that is, made more passes—than their opponents only twice, according to the FourFourTwo StatsZone app. One of those occasions was against a Bournemouth side reduced to 10 men by a 57th-minute red card.

This tactical choice plays to Leicester’s strengths. The Foxes have a skillful distributor in N’Golo Kanté, quick attackers in Jamie Vardy, Riyad Mahrez, and Shinji Okazaki, and a killer instinct in front of goal. That last attribute has given the team the best results in converting shots within the penalty area. (See 7AM Kickoff’s "Leicester are winning the league through superior finishing” for an analysis.)

One way, then, for Arsenal to mitigate Leicester’s strengths would be to relinquish possession to the visitors. This would need to happen in a controlled way with Arsenal’s players organized, coordinated, and positioned behind the ball.

Although such an approach would mark a departure from Arsenal’s overall playing philosophy, there’s considerable precedent for it. In important matches against accomplished opponents, such as Bayern Munich and Manchester City, the Gunners have sacrificed possession for the sake of controlling dangerous spaces.

Granted, Bayern and Man City are possession-based sides and were more than happy to take Arsenal up on the offer. It’s not clear how a possession-averse side like Leicester would respond.

Still, last season Arsenal went to West Ham, managed by defense-and-long-ball aficionado Sam Allardyce, compiled just 42 percent possession, and came away 2-1 winners. A similar approach and result would be welcome on Sunday.

Make Leicester’s defense move

In September, Arsenal succeeded in unsettling Leicester’s back line. They’re less susceptible to speed now because they’re less adventurous and better protected by Kanté and Danny Drinkwater. That certainly showed in last week’s win over Man City, when Sergio Aguero, David Silva, and Raheem Sterling failed to make a telling mark despite their quickness.

But, as Adrian Clarke points out on the Official Arsenal Weekly Podcast, Leicester center backs Wes Morgan and Robert Huth are not the fleetest afoot and might not cover a midfield run from Aaron Ramsey or Mesut Özil if Arsenal center forward Olivier Giroud can occupy both of them for an instant.

Similarly, the Leicester fullbacks, Danny Simpson and Christian Fuchs, are not all that fast by the standards of the Premier League. They rely on sound positioning and organization to control wide attackers. Counterattacks at speed by Alexis Sanchez and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain or the kind of direct play Tim Stillman described on this week's Arsenal Vision Post-Match Podcast could stake Arsenal to an advantage.

Double up Riyad Mahrez

Mahrez is the Foxes’ creative genius and, with Vardy, their one-two goal combination. Keeping him quiet will go a long way, though not all the way, to squelching Leicester’s attack.

Arsenal largely succeeded at this task in September by skillful defending on its left. Fullback Nacho Monreal had an excellent day and received consistent support from midfielder Santi Cazorla. The two didn’t allow Mahrez to surge into attack, and they limited the space through which he could dribble. Mahrez began to work the other flank in response.

Cazorla’s absence complicates Arsenal’s effort to reprise this performance. Ramsey is capable of the diligence required, as he showed against Bournemouth last weekend and in prior seasons as Mikel Arteta’s midfield partner. But his work will have to be in synch with Monreal’s and with that of either Mathieu Flamini or Francis Coquelin. Flamini, who started alongside Cazorla at Leicester, hasn’t developed the most seamless partnership with Ramsey, while Coquelin has hardly played with the Welshman.

Defending against the threat posed by Mahrez will therefore be a real test.

Match Leicester’s formation

This would be a radical and unlikely choice.

Leicester’s setup is described as a 4-4-2, but it’s more of a 4-4-1-1 or even a 4-5-1. Okazaki plays behind Vardy and serves as both a second striker and as an additional midfielder. His energy and ability in the tackle permit him to execute these dual roles.

Arsenal could send out a mirror image of this formation, which would give the Gunners more security to relinquish the ball (as in the option above). It would also put Arsenal players in better position to pressure Leicester’s long passes from midfield.

Those are both reasonable objectives, but committing to this structure would involve several major personnel changes. First, to match not only Leicester’s formation but its energy, Arsenal would most likely position Ramsey further forward. He’d be the best equipped to execute the Okazaki role, as he does for the Welsh national side.

With Ramsey in a more advanced role than normal, Arsenal would need a different partnership in central midfield, some mix of Flamini, Coquelin, and Mohammed Elneny. Playmaker Mesut Özil would shift to one flank with Alexis on the other. Giroud could still lead the line in this setup, but the attack would be more static than is customary.

I don’t think we’ll see this structure or lineup on Sunday. It would take Arsenal away from its strengths, disrupt the flow, and dislodge the team’s best player this season. Wenger isn’t likely to take such a gamble in this crucial encounter.

There are other, more tested, ways of making the most of Arsenal’s advantages while minimizing Leicester’s considerable threats. No doubt as Sunday’s critical encounter approaches, Wenger and his staff are weighing these options with more experience and wisdom than Arsenal bloggers and twitterati would.

Arsenal's Tactical Triumph

While we marvel in the sublime skill and breathtaking speed Arsenal displayed against Manchester United on Sunday, we should also praise the team’s tactical triumph. The flexibility that manager Arsène Wenger and his players displayed bamboozled the visitors and their supposed tactical genius of a manager, Louis van Gaal.

In fact, van Gaal’s approach played right into Arsenal’s hands, permitting the Gunners to emphasize their strengths and to exploit Manchester United’s weaknesses. Once Arsenal had secured the three-goal advantage, they adapted to various situations and remained the superior force.
 
Let’s look at how the game plans unfolded.

Early onslaught

Arsenal showed every intention of starting the match assertively. This not only represented a response to the poor midweek showing in the Champions League against Olympiacos, but it also conformed to the patterns of this Premier League season. In particular, the home team takes the initiative early to gain the superiority it needs to play on the counterattack. (See Danny Higginbotham’s column in The Independent for a clear explanation of this trend.)

Two goals before the 10-minute mark are the proof Arsenal succeeded. Here’s evidence of the intention: Deep-lying midfielder Francis Coquelin’s position just before Alexis Sanchez opened the scoring.

Coquelin helps start the attack, then follows Hector Bellerin and Mesut Özil up the right side of the pitch into an advanced position for a defensive midfielder. From where he is, he can trouble three of United’s possible escape routes, via Wayne Rooney, Bastian Schweinsteiger, or Memphis Depay.

Coquelin joins attack but positions himself to thwart any possible United counter-attack

As it happens, Manchester United does intercept Bellerin’s centering pass, but Coquelin beats Memphis to the ball and gets it back to Özil. That’s when Özil’s quick interchange with Aaron Ramsey and sprint to the byline scramble the Manchester defense and create the scoring opportunity.

Manchester United’s susceptibility

The buildup to this play also reveals Manchester United’s vulnerability and the flaws of its game plan.

Van Gaal apparently decided to man-mark Arsenal in the center of the pitch. Schweinsteiger covered Santi Cazorla, Rooney was assigned Coquelin, and Michael Carrick was on Özil.

United's man marking the midfield put them at a distinct disadvantage in controlling the match

This setup handed the initiative to Arsenal. Schweinsteiger is 31 years old; Cazorla is only a year younger but a magician with the ball. Rooney is 29; Coquelin, 24. Carrick is 34; Ozil, 26. Add the speed of thought and passing to the age difference, and Arsenal were just too quick in the midfield.

A word here, too, about the role of Per Mertesacker. Schweinsteiger leaves Cazorla and tries to close down the Arsenal captain, but Mertesacker outfoxes him with a one-touch pass to Coquelin, who has eluded Rooney. This springs the attack.

Flailing fullbacks

Another consequence of Manchester United’s man-marking in the midfield was that its fullbacks had very little support defending the spaces on the flanks. Alexis took advantage of this situation, running Matteo Darmian ragged.

The situation titled even more favorably toward Arsenal because Manchester United central defenders Chris Smalling and, in particular, Daley Blind were sensitive to the threat of Theo Walcott. Walcott’s speed and movement upset the defensive balance and, just before the third Arsenal goal, forced Darmian into a narrow position, leaving Alexis free to receive Walcott’s pass and move into a threatening position with the ball. (See Adrian Clark's analysis of this passage of play on The Breakdown on the official Arsenal website.)

With Ashley Young defending like a winger playing fullback on Manchester United's left, the effectiveness of Arsenal’s Bellerin and Nacho Monreal was a stark contrast.

Consolidation

Immediately after Alexis drove home his second goal of the first 20 minutes, Arsenal’s objective changed. A three-goal lead made controlling dangerous spaces the priority. Manchester United’s ponderous play helped Arsenal in this respect, as did the shift to a 4-4-1-1 formation.

Coquelin and Cazorla moved together closer to the center of the pitch and Arsenal’s center backs, while Alexis and Ramsey dropped deeper from their attacking initial positions.

Arsenal move to a 4-4-1-1 to protect the lead

Alexis is slightly advanced here because he’s engaging Darmian on Arsenal’s left, but overall this is the compact shape Arsenal used to protect its lead and start further counterattacks.

It’s a perfect response to the game situation, Arsenal having earned the right to play on the counter with its early three-goal blitz.

Adaptation

At halftime, Van Gaal replaced Darmian with Antonio Valencia and Memphis with Marouane Fellaini. The latter brought his physical-bordering-on-fouly presence into the center of midfield. This change spurred the visitors to become more assertive in midfield, creating two shots on target midway through the half.

Wenger and his team adapted. He instructed Ramsey to leave his post on the right and join Coquelin and Cazorla in the center of midfield. Özil went right, and Arsenal took a 4-3-3 shape.

Ramsey tucks in to form a 4-3-3 to adjust to United's halftime changes

This adjustment largely succeeded in upsetting Manchester United’s rhythm.

Later, Wenger made one final shift, introducing the more physical center forward presence of Olivier Giroud and returning to the 4-2-3-1 shape from which Arsenal had started the match. Only this time, Ramsey took the playmaker role and joined Giroud in defending from the front of the formation. Substitute Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain became the main threat on the counterattack, nearly capping the scoring with a chip off the bar in injury time.

Had that gone in, the final score of 4-0 would not have flattered Arsenal. With a clear game plan, tactical flexibility, expert execution, a focused mentality, and physical commitment, the Gunners dispatched one of its bogey teams and made manifest their potential to mount a title challenge.

(Graphics courtesy YouAreMyArsenal)

Arsenal's Pressing Problem

In Arsenal's last two Premier League matches away from home, Tottenham and Crystal Palace pressed the Gunners aggressively. This activity stymied Arsenal's flow in midfield, the foundation of its offense, and put its defense under pressure.

Many statistics from these games show just how effective this tactic proved. Arsenal were outshot in both matches, but more telling was how much Arsenal struggled to move the ball. The team completed just 72 percent of its passes against Palace and 70 percent against Tottenham. Those figures fall far below Arsenal's season average of 83 percent, which ranks fifth in the Premier League. (Stats from OptaSports via WhoScored.com.)

The risk-reward tradeoff favors opponents

Meanwhile, the major risk of a pressing approach did not materialize. It's thought that a team might succeed in pressing Arsenal for a limited period of time; when the opposition's legs and concentration weaken, Arsenal can profit.

But neither Palace nor Spurs exhausted itself by pressing. On the contrary, the tactic seemed to wear Arsenal down, creating late lapses that led to goals. 

The successes of these two opponents, and those earlier in the season of Borussia Dortmund and Liverpool, could encourage others to take a similar approach when they host Arsenal. (Listen to this week's Arsecast Extra Episode 56 for an apprehensive discussion of this possibility.)

Arsenal manager Arsène Wenger won't be surprised by this development. After all, aggressive pressing damaged his side in several high-profile away matches of the 2013-14 campaign. Partially in response, he and his staff installed a 4-1-4-1 setup to relieve the pressure on the midfield, focus on covering space, and enable greater flexibility. (See "A Look at Arsenal's Move to the 4-1-4-1.")

Given that Arsenal haven't been able to enjoy these advantages consistently, it's worth exploring other solutions to the bedevilling pressing tactics.

Going airborne

There seem to be two general answers to the assertive press: 1. Go over it; 2. Go through it.

One way to go over the press more effectively would be to return Wojciech Szczesny to the starting goalkeeper spot. Although Szczesny has made some questionable decisions distributing the ball against the high press, notably leading to Tottenham's opening goal at the Emirates in September's 1-1 draw, he varies his passing more than does current first-choice David Ospina.

As Tim Stillman observes in his recent Arseblog column "Ospina and Szczesny Keep the Debate Going," Szczesny has relied on the long ball much less than Ospina has. The Polish keeper has averaged 4.9 long balls and 23.3 passes per match over his 17 Premier League appearances this season, while his Colombian teammate has made, on average, 14 long balls and 28.8 passes per match in seven league appearances.

Granted, Szczesny has often played without center forward Olivier Giroud, while Giroud has provided a target for Ospina in six of his seven League appearances. That may explain some of the discrepancy, as Stillman admits. Ospina seems to aim most of his kicks at the striker, making it simpler for the opposition to defend. And those kicks haven't been especially long, meaning that the opponents' pressing midfield can swarm Giroud and his midfield passing outlets.

This points to another adjustment to bypass the press--offer a different aerial outlet. We saw this alternative at Palace, as Mesut Özil occupied an advanced position, received some long passes, and controlled the ball to relieve pressure. Arsenal could also move Danny Welbeck up the pitch for goal kicks, giving the goalkeeper another target and dividing defenders' attention. A third option might appear when right back Mathieu Debuchy returns from injury; he's an effective relief valve and long-ball target, much as his predecessor Bacary Sagna was.

Arsenal could also vary the source of the long ball, launching from one of the defenders or a deep-lying midfielder. Mikel Arteta's absence makes this choice less appealing. He attempted, on average, 5.7 long passes per game over the 2012-13 and 2013-14 Premier League campaigns, completing an average of 5.0. Contrast Arteta's work in that regard to the passing of Francis Coquelin, who has attempted just two long passes and completed 1.2, on average, during his 11 Premier League appearances this season.

The land route

The downsides of the aerial approach are the sacrifices of possession and control as well as the invitation of more pressure on the midfield. If the long pass doesn't stick or isn't long enough, the opposition can close down Arsenal quickly. That's why the second approach -- going through the press, is appealing.

The problem is that the best personnel to provide that response were not available at Tottenham or Palace. Arteta's calmness on the ball and passing efficiency would have helped this terrestrial approach. Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain'a speed and power may have allowed him to elude and out-muscle aggressive opponents. (See "The Ox Rocks Arsenal 3.0.") Even Jack Wilshere, using ball control and quick surges, might have succeeded in getting through the perilous midfield.

Staying the course

Wenger may weigh these options and decide, based on the personnel at his disposal, to maintain the team's tactics against pressing sides. That would not be an unreasonable decision, especially given the requirement that pressing be precise, tireless, and comprehensive or risk leaving gaps that Arsenal's quick movement, thought, and passing can exploit.

Arsenal's depth also serves the existing approach because it allows the manager to introduce a high-energy substitute like Tomas Rosicky or a high-speed sub like Theo Walcott just as the opponents' energies wane.

The experiences at Tottenham and Palace do suggest, though, that Arsenal's play cannot be passive. The lesson is that even if the Gunners concede possession and look to counter-attack, they need to engage actively for the full period of play.

Arsène Wenger's Risk Tolerance

During Arsenal manager Arsène Wenger's press conferences after the North London Derby and before the Galatasaray Champions League match, assembled media asked at least 25 questions. Only one of those questions sought the manager's perspective on a newsworthy item from the 1-1 draw with Tottenham: Why was star signing Alexis Sanchez not in the starting lineup?

Wenger's response was brief. "It was the selection of the day," he said. Was there any medical reason? "No, no, no, no."

That was it on the subject. No one probed the rationale for excluding the £30-million-plus summer acquisition, source of the club's second highest transfer fee, who had already scored four goals for Arsenal account.

James McNicholas (@Gunnerblog) raised this question and offered some potential reasons in his ESPN FC blog post "Sanchez Error Tops the List of Questions to Ask Wenger."  I'm drawn to a related but broader question, "How do you weigh the risk tradeoffs when you structure and select a starting XI?"

This strikes me as a legitimate and germane line of inquiry. Legitimate because, unlike transfer dealings, injuries, finances, and many other issues, the matchday construction of the team falls entirely within the manager's control; that's his core responsibility. It's a germane question because the team soon goes to Chelsea, site of last season's tactical disaster and mauling.

Deliberating risks in the tactical system

The experience at Chelsea, Liverpool, and Everton and continued signs of vulnerability to counterattacks should be provoking serious deliberations among the Arsenal manager and his assistants. In particular, they should be weighing the risks of sending both fullbacks into the attacking half of the field against the downsides of instructing them to remain in defensive territory.

More astute and experienced tactical observers than I have noted that Wenger has chosen the more assertive approach for years. It's still worth asking whether the benefits of extra players at the offensive end, such as the potential of outnumbering the opposition on the flanks, warrant the consistent and therefore predictable forward presence of Arsenal fullbacks. Against some opponents, those advantages are probably worth the risk; against speedy and precise opposition, perhaps not.

Assessing drawbacks to subtle structural changes

A second major tactical risk grows out of the new 4-1-4-1 formation. My colleague Michael Price has argued convincingly in "A Look at Arsenal's Move to the 4-1-4-1" that this change is a response to the pressing and counterattacking that overwhelmed Arsenal in away games against top opposition last season.

The 4-1-4-1 setup could mitigate that risk in the long run as it allows Arsenal players to close down the opposition more quickly. However, it's not a comfortable or fully formed system yet, so for the moment it heightens the risk that the defense will be overrun, particularly if the fullbacks' forays forward continue.

The manager has said that the formation represents only a subtle shift, and indeed it morphed comfortably and successfully into a 4-2-3-1 in the wins against Aston Villa and Galatasaray. In some ways, though, the subtlety only heightens the risk. That's because the players have to understand and execute the approach at a fine level of nuance. These mental and physical demands come on the heels of a World Cup, which taxed most of Arsenal's first team and shortened the period to hone this new approach.

Given that the 2013-14 system produced 79 points and an FA Cup, it's reasonable to ask whether the risks of the new system are worth taking on.

Balancing risks in team selection

The personnel available to the manager, even in light of multiple injuries, creates another series of risk tradeoffs.

The threats of being outnumbered in midfield and the defensive zone could, for example, be dealt with by moving the wide forwards closer to the back line, which is an approach we saw late in the 2012-13 season and early in the 2013-14 campaign. The risks in that are passivity and ceding possession, but the speed of new players Sanchez and Danny Welbeck and the returning Theo Walcott would worry the opposition even if it does control the ball.

Let's accept, though, that Wenger prefers a more proactive approach, and his knowledge, success, and teams' flair make me hesitate to question that philosophy. What I would nevertheless ask about is the omission of Sanchez from the starting XI, especially given the objectives of the evolving system. If the 4-1-4-1 seeks to follow Pep Guardiola's Bayern Munich and its coordinated pressing, doesn't Sanchez seem the perfect player to harry the opposition from a wide forward position?

Perhaps the balance Wenger was trying to strike against Tottenham was between what his team did with the ball and what it did without it. As Tim Stillman (@LittleDutchVA) observed in his weekly column for Arseblog last week, Sanchez attempts daring moves that often result in losing the ball. If the manager is prioritizing ball retention over offensive creativity, then that's a case for leaving Sanchez on the bench. It's also a reason to leave out Jack Wilshere in favor of Santi Cazorla in midfield, but Wilshere got the start against Tottenham.

These decisions have faded from view after the team's exhilarating performance against Galatasaray. That game -- and the role Sanchez played in it -- makes a compelling argument that his playing style represents a risk worth bearing.  Otherwise, we'd have to entertain the possibility that the club spent more than £30 million on a player before its manager reached the conclusion that his style is too cavalier. That seems like an even more worrying proposition.