Arsenal's early season struggles have brought out the well worn and
often angry portrayals of manager Arsène Wenger's tactical cluelessness,
his transfer ineptitude, his awkward man-management, and his
geriatric stubbornness.
The suspect evidence supporting these
characterizations and the logical fallacy of the Arsenal=Arsène equation
only seem to intensify the appeal of these arguments. It's gotten to
the point that unthinking perceptions are reshaping the Arsenal brand;
as a result, the club is facing a deeper issue than the manager's
performance or the team's lackluster form.
What makes a football brand
In
a largely problematic account of Arsenal's 2013-14 season ("Arsène and
Arsenal: The Quest to Rediscover Past Glories"), Alex Fynn presents a
strong foundation in brand theory. Brands aren't just logos or taglines,
explains Fynn, but are collections and expressions of the rational and
emotional attributes associated with an organization.
These
attributes give brands distinctive personalities, such as Volvo's "Crisp
and Safe" and Apple's "Cool and Innovative," which shape the main
characters in those organizations' stories. The dramatic or comedic pull
of these stories, along with the personalities and values they express,
attract like-minded individuals.
Even more than other sports,
football engenders strong brands, Fynn points out, because the dramatic
impact is so great. One late moment of brilliance or bad fortune can
overturn a result that seemed a foregone conclusion for 89 minutes.
That's unmatched dramatic potential.
The geographic, historical,
and cultural identifications of football clubs also make them sturdy
vessels for brands, and clubs and their supporters can easily identify
themselves in opposition to the "other" created by rivalries.
Elements of the Arsenal brand
Although
Arsenal's brand benefits from clear differentiation with Tottenham,
Chelsea, and Manchester United, the club has reaped its biggest
reputational reward by honing its own personality. I would define this
as "Refined, Successful, and Sensible." (See "The Brand's the Thing" and "Whiffing on Risk" for additional thoughts.)
At the foundation of these personality traits lie the club's historical values:
- A distinctive balance between English football tradition and innovation
- Adherence to standards of conduct that denote "class"
- Consistent success at the highest level of the sport
Arsenal
promises those who have identified with it that it will live out these
values and behave in accordance with its underlying
personality. Breaking that promise could make supporters and sponsors
question their loyalty, with major cultural and financial consequences.
Fissures
Just
three months ago, Arsenal appeared to be reaffirming its
core personality and values, with world-class acquisitions joining the
club soon after an FA Cup triumph. The speed and irrationality of the
shift in perceptions should trouble CEO Ivan Gazidis and other club
executives, because they suggest that a different, much less positive,
brand story is replacing the advantageous one.
Here's how it's
happening: First, the promise of potential success appears to be an
empty one. It's extremely unlikely that the club will win the Premier
League or the Champions League this season. That's the standard of
success the club has established for itself, and it will once again fall
short.
Instead, as Andrew Mangan pointed out on the November 7 Arsecast, we are witnessing a routine of top-four league finishes and exits after the round of 16 of the Champions League.
This
pattern of performance lessens the excitement because it's so
predictable. Add that to the team's inability to win matches against the
top domestic competition, and you'll struggle to find compelling drama.
Second,
the club's image as an innovator is getting weaker. With the same
manager for 18 years, no matter how sincerely he might profess new ideas
or his focus on the future, Arsenal is always going to appear
hidebound. (One reason I think so many supporters were excited about the
appointment of Shad Forsythe as head of athletic performance
enhancement is that it hinted at the club's innovative best.)
The
third brand problem is that the personality trait "Sensible" is being
undermined by a perception that identical weaknesses cause the same
results year in, year out. Facts and reasonable analysis to the
contrary, "defensive frailty" is Arsenal's downfall. It doesn't matter
that the major problem in 2013-14 might well have been a lack of speed
and in 2012-13 a lack of creativity. The story is already written.
The persistence and immediacy of this narrative are strong evidence that Arsenal's brand has shifted.
Impact
If
this analysis is right, a succession of good results won't move the
brand back onto favorable ground. Only a major achievement, a Premier
League title or a Champions League trophy, will be sufficient for that.
Major
sponsors seem comfortable with this scenario. The lucrative deals with
Emirates Airlines for shirt and stadium sponsorship and Puma for playing
gear indicate that those companies continue to see considerable
advantage in aligning with Arsenal. How secondary and regional sponsors
weigh the Arsenal brand will be crucial to higher commercial revenue.
Meanwhile,
supporters have communicated mixed messages about their loyalty to the
brand. The increase in season ticket prices, coming as it did as the
brand was shifting, sparked vocal criticism. What appeared an attempt to
capitalize on the FA Cup success and hope for the future has instead
made longtime match goers question their commitment to an organization
whose brand promises are shaky.
Despite the reaction, the waiting
list for Arsenal season tickets remains long. What proportion of season
ticket holders in years to come will be new? How many ticket holders
will leave their seats empty? And how will those developments affect the
stadium atmosphere, which is part of what any sports organization sells
to sponsors, broadcasters, and fans?
These are potentially much
more troubling questions for the club than are any about the manager's
transfer, team setup, or personnel decisions. They aren't as dramatic or
obvious, but structural questions rarely are.
Each Premier League campaign has its own dynamics. We can search for
patterns, correlations, and precedents, but ultimately every series of
38 matches that begins in August and ends in May takes its own
independent shape. That makes the 10-match milepost an arbitrary
measuring point.
Even so, it is a point, a round number a little
more than a quarter of the way through the season. Arsenal has played
more than half the teams in the league, so it's illustrative if not
definitive to look at developments thus far.
The message from the overall numbers
A
fair expectation at the start of any sporting campaign is for a team to
make progress on its previous season. That was a reasonable objective
for Arsenal as it set out on its 2014-15 Premier League effort,
particularly because the FA Cup triumph, world-class summer signings,
and a full season's acclimatization for star playmaker Mesut Özil seemed
to have the club on a positive trajectory. (See my preseason
assessment, "The Arsenal: Forward, Upward, or on Some Generally Positive Trajectory.")
In
a broad-brush analysis, the first 10 matches don't show movement
upward. The 2013-14 squad produced 25 points in its first 10 matches,
while the 2014-15 version has tallied just 17.
The opposition has
been tougher this season, with the competition having averaged 12.7
points from the first 10 matches, compared with 10.9 points in 2013-14.
The median figures, which discount the outliers, tell a slightly
different story, 11 points vs. 10.5, indicating that the schedule has
been only a bit more difficult.
The results from comparable
fixtures between the two campaigns aren't as promising, either. Only the
draw at Everton marked an improvement on last season's performances,
while home draws against Tottenham and Hull City and the away draw
against newly promoted Leicester City leave Arsenal five points off its
returns from parallel matches in 2013-14.
As a result, over the
remaining 28 matches, Arsenal will have to match its wins of 2013-14 and
pick up points from draws or losses--such as West Bromwich Albion away,
Stoke away, and Aston Villa at home--to reach at least 79 points again.
The positives from relative numbers
Because
each season is distinctive, though, Arsenal may not have to amass 79
points to achieve a higher final position in the league table. It all
depends on the competition.
At this point, the top of the league
is not as congested as it was in 2013-14. Chelsea leads the way with 26
points, and four other clubs have 17 points or more. In 2013-14,
Arsenal's 25 points topped the table after 10 matches, while seven
others had at least 17 points. That more tightly packed group of early
leaders produced the most accomplished top four in points terms in
Premier League history.
Let's look at 2010-11, the last season to
follow a World Cup, for a different example. That year, Manchester
United won the league with 80 points; Arsenal finished fourth with just
68 points, two fewer than both Chelsea and Manchester City. Tottenham
were fifth at 62.
The start of that season bears some similarity
to the first 10 matches of the current campaign. At the same point, just
four teams stood at 17 points or higher, Arsenal among them with 20,
putting them in second place. (All standings from tables on premierleague.com.)
Telling statistics
In that competitive setting, one set of in-game statistical measures stands out.
According to whoscored.com,
Arsenal has taken the second highest number of shots per game (17.3)
through the first ten matches and the third highest shots on goal per
game (5.6). However, it's only sixth in goals scored, with 18.
That
is, Arsenal has scored on just 10 percent of its shots. Meanwhile, its
opponents have produced 11 goals from 74 shots, or 15 percent.
This
discrepancy points toward the most prominent statistical difference in
Arsenal's offense between 2013-14 overall and this season so far, the
number of shots it has taken outside the penalty area. That average
figure increased from 5.0 last season to 8.4 in the first ten matches of
2014-15, the highest in the league by 13 percent. None of those shots
has gone in.
Indeed, manager Arsène Wenger's own assessment, shared on Arsenal Player
before Arsenal faced Burnley in the 10th match of the season,
emphasized the point. "On the efficiency front, we can do better," he
said, "because if you look at the chances we have created and we have
given away, I think we have created many chances, and our finishing was
not at the expected level. And we gave very few chances away, but the
chances we have given away are of quality, and that's what you want to
do better."
If the manager can convey his seriousness about better
efficiency to the players, we may see fewer of the ineffective shots
from distance going forward.
The qualitative story
Statistics
can help us understand performance trends, but fans' interest has more
to do with qualitative judgments. In essence, we're assessing if the
club is producing entertainment value: Is the team performing
attractively as a whole, and are players delivering individually?
The
answer to the first question has to be "not yet." With a few
exceptions, such as the first 20 minutes against Manchester City and the
last 20 against Burnley, the team's performances have left something to
be desired.
I'm not inclined to identify a cause or causes because that would produce simplistic and misleading analysis.
What
can be said is that injuries to several important players, defenders
Mathieu Debuchy and Laurent Koscielny, captain Mikel Arteta, center
forward Oliver Giroud, as well as Özil, haven't helped. Tactical
shifting may have played a role, too, although I hesitate to conclude
that an established approach would have improved the attractiveness or
the results.
As for the second question, Alexis has been the
standout performer, netting seven goals in his first 10 league matches.
Other high-profile summer acquisitions, striker Danny Welbeck and
defender Calum Chambers, have also had more solid performances than poor
ones. The quality of the new boys overall has therefore been a plus.
Most
returning players haven't quite met the standards they set last season,
but more telling is the sense that the whole is less than the sum of
the parts at the moment.
All the components might add up
eventually; that would boost the enjoyment and entertainment we
supporters receive. It would also solidify a place closer to the top of
the table, even if the raw numbers fall short of last season's. That's
something to hold onto amidst legitimate current concerns.
The milestones of recent weeks -- manager Arsène Wenger's 65th
birthday and the 10-year anniversary of the 49-game unbeaten run, in
particular -- have prompted wistful looks back at the early years of the
Wenger era. That's when Arsenal led the way in the English game with an
energetic, eye-catching style of play and a cast of talented,
compelling characters.
The journalist Amy Lawrence has chronicled
the 2003-2004 team in "Invincible: Inside Arsenal's Unbeaten 2003-2004
Season," by all accounts a story well-told. Lawrence has also appeared
on several Arsenal podcasts, such as the 24 October Arsecast and The Tuesday Club Invincibles Special, to share her experiences as a fan and researcher.
Discussing
her book, Lawrence has noted that the unbeaten season had to happen
that year, because that season Roman Abramovich injected £100 million
into Chelsea and fundamentally changed the contest.
Indeed, the point in time was crucial. Circumstances have never been and will never be the same.
We
should therefore take a skeptical view of efforts at nostalgia of the
unbeaten season and of the past generally. Partly because, as Tim
Stillman recently put it in his Arseblog column "Seasons in the Sun,"
"the glorious bygone age never existed," but also because glorification
of the past undermines the entertainment offered us in the present.
The attractions
Supporters
will articulate their motivations in different ways, but at root aren't
we all in it for the entertainment? Some mixture of the matchday
experience, the feeling of common cause, the artistry of athletic feats,
the drama of competition, the unpredictability of the outcome, and the
reliving of youth makes professional sport entertaining for each of us.
Otherwise, we'd pass our time differently.
There's certainly a
contingent in it for the moaning or low-stakes gallows humor, both of
which I suppose are forms of entertainment. For me, though, the point is
enjoyment.
I enjoy the Arsenal on many levels:
- The
values I share with the club, such as transparency, respect for others
no matter their backgrounds, and the aesthetics of a well-run business
(admittedly, these values also rely on a selective interpretation of the
club's past)
- The performances on the pitch during the season at hand
- An approach to management and a style of play that put a priority on intelligence
- The humorous, thoughtful communication with fellow supporters
- The matchday experience with other supporters
- The attractive characters in management and in the playing squad
- The rich material for analysis provided by numbers 1-6 above
Almost
none of the enjoyment comes from revisiting the specifics of past
Arsenal performances. That's not to say I don't remember where I was or
with whom or how that experience made me feel; I do. It's just that the
source of my enjoyment, entertainment, and identity as an Arsenal
supporter doesn't lie there.
Peoples separated by an ocean and a common language
This
all might seem cold, clinical. If so, my outlook has been
professionally ingrained, first as a sports journalist and then as a
history doctoral student. Both professions encourage a distance from
events and apply critical techniques to understand them. Neither sees
its purpose as the assembly or facts, dates, or trivia, which serve for
many as the stuff of history and sports fandom.
My perspective
also might come across as a particularly American. Our culture doesn't
tend to mine the past to identify us collectively in the present, at
least not in the early 21st century. Citizens of other, older nations
engage in a more active, albeit one-way, conversation with the past.
David Winner's "Those Feet: A Sensual History of English Football"
examines how this exchange has played out in England and argues that
football nostalgia and negativity are responses to the question of
English identity after the end of the Empire.
I'm not placing a
value judgment on this tendency. The interaction of identity and memory
is complicated, and denigrating or elevating how others handle that
complexity seems presumptuous. Where I do draw the line is when that
process leads to exclusionary thinking, in our case seeing only "true"
Arsenal fans as legitimate because they display an approved perspective
on the club's past or can articulate their own experiences according to a
specific script.
This framework contributes to the circular
firing squad of Arsenal supporters, a distinctly destructive and
unentertaining phenomenon.
This doesn't mean we should seek
unanimity of perspective and opinion. The diversity of views is part of
what makes following the Arsenal so attractive. What I am suggesting is
that we don't venerate figures from the past or fixate on experiences,
results, and emotions of seasons gone by.
The glory of now
By
keeping history in its appropriate context, we should be able to
appreciate the present even more. The parochial days of muddy pitches
trod by Englishmen aren't coming back, and only the most reactionary
among us aren't glad about that. No amount of moaning about financial
obscenity, complaining about foreign influences, and marginalizing
non-English supporters will stop the increasing globalization of the
game.
If entertainment is the objective, we should embrace these
developments. After all, money from a worldwide audience attracts the
highest quality talent to the Premier League, and the ease of travel and
commerce allows top players from across the world to join English
sides. A league without Alexis Sanchez and Sergio Aguero just wouldn't
be as enjoyable.
That's where nostalgia ultimately leads, to a fantasy blinding us to a profoundly entertaining present.
This month Arsène Wenger marked 18 years as manager of Arsenal
Football Club, an extraordinary tenure in professional sports. He's been
in charge for 1,023 Premier League matches, while the next
longest-serving manager, the embattled Newcastle United boss Alan
Pardew, has served only 171. In the relatively near future, though,
Wenger will depart.
This eventuality seems to be dawning on club
officials. "The biggest challenge we're going to face as a club is that,
when the transition from Arsène to our next manager happens--and I
don't know when that's going to be--that we come through that strongly,"
CEO Ivan Gazidis said in a recent interview on the Arsenal website.
Is
succession actually the "biggest challenge"? Bigger than competing with
the financial might of Chelsea, Manchester City, and Manchester United?
Perhaps not. Those issues are structural, will exist regardless of who
manages Arsenal in 2017 and beyond, and indeed raise the stakes of the
appointment.
For that reason, a thoughtful, thorough plan is
essential to guide the club through this important period. This article
explores the Board's public pronouncements on the issue and outlines
what we should look for as evidence of an effective succession plan.
The Arsenal Board's readiness to plan and to act
The
close of the 2013-14 season should have energized the Arsenal Board and
Gazidis to intensify succession planning. That's because credible
reports suggested that Wenger was prepared to decline the renewal offer
had his team not won the 2014 FA Cup. Gazidis's comments at the time
showed that the club was in no way prepared for that possibility. (See
my personal blog post "And All the Clocks Wound Down".)
So
far, the Board doesn't appear to be bringing much urgency to the task.
At Thursday's Annual General Meeting of shareholders, Chairman Sir Chips
Keswick said, "It's premature to speculate about a successor to Arsène.
I'm delighted he has signed a three-year contract. Rest assured, we
follow the situation carefully... It's not being complacent--we think
about it all the time--I hope when the time comes we will have a
solution that pleases you."
I'd rest a lot more assured if the
language coming from the board were more assertive. Instead of "we
follow the situation carefully," Sir Chips should be saying, "we have
launched a plan to guide our decisions."
Even if Sir Chips is only displaying English reserve,
it's hardly a strong response to what Gazidis called "the biggest
challenge." The approach seems instead to invite problems that befall
many organizations in transition.
"They fail to recognize the need
for a strategy for this critical business process, they haven't had
great exposure to what other organizations are doing, and they haven't
thought through what their organization should be doing given its unique
set of circumstances." That's Scott Saslow, founder and CEO of a
leadership development consultancy, who collaborates with Stanford
University on research with senior executives. He could be describing Arsenal's leadership as it appears now.
What would indicate a plan
That
passive image is all anyone has to go on at the moment, because no one at the
club has detailed its approach to succession planning.
What would a
prepared organization look like? According to Stanford Professor David
Larcker and Stephen Miles, vice chairman of executive recruiters
Heidrick and Struggles (page 14 of the presentation here), the steps an organization should take in succession planning include:
- Add succession expertise to the board, particularly the person chairing the search committee
- Think of the succession plan as a multi-person event also involving internal officials not promoted
- Develop a robust succession architecture that covers time horizons from immediate emergencies to five years
- Develop and refine a skills and experience profile
- Use external advisers to assess candidates and work closely with the board
- Prepare to move individuals off the current management team if they block the development of others
- Expose internal candidates to the board
- Engage in a confidential external search
- Provide ongoing support to entire management team after transition
Using
these guidelines, we can assess the club's preparedness. All the club's
activities won't be obvious or public, but the Board could start by
clarifying who is primarily responsible for the appointment. Is it the
full Board, a smaller group, or Gazidis? That's a crucial question. Not
only does the authority need to be established, but that individual's or
group's experience with these kinds of transitions could determine the
search's success.
Another important statement would address
Wenger's involvement. Studies suggest he should definitely have a role,
perhaps even as far as identifying a candidate within the organization,
but his influence on the decision should be minimal. Too much
involvement from the outgoing manager can produce successors like
Manchester United's ill-fated David Moyes.
Need for a seasoned executive
The
search that brought Wenger to the club in 1996 was, by most accounts, a
one-man affair, planned and executed by former vice chairman David
Dein. He is no longer in a position to shape the board's thinking on
Wenger's replacement or to work his network on the club's behalf.
The
current Arsenal Board falls short of the Dein standard of experience.
It's accurate that Josh Kroenke, the newest member of the Arsenal
Board, was president of the NHL's Colorado Avalanche in 2013 when it
let head coach Joe Sacco go and hired Patrick Roy. But that doesn't seem
like adequate experience for a high-profile Premier League appointment.
(One
interesting point about the Avalanche's signing of Roy: It came just
after the franchise elevated longtime captain Joe Sakic to lead hockey
operations. So there is precedent in Kroenke Sports Enterprises for
hiring former players to serve in prominent, decision-making positions.)
Gazidis?
He communicates extremely effectively, makes decisions methodically,
cares about the club's future, and publicly acknowledges the enormity of
the task of replacing Wenger. What neither he nor anyone else at the
club has yet displayed is any urgency to set forth the principles and
processes to guide the eventual transition. As a result, we're left to wonder how prepared the club is.
The recent, revealing interview with Andries Jonker, head of the
Arsenal academy, provides considerable food for thought as the club and
its shareholders prepare for Thursday's Annual General Meeting.
Because Jonker does not seem shy about sharing his opinions with the Dutch publication Voetball International (translated on Arseblog in "Jonker: Arsenal scouting must be restructured"),
his observations offer an unvarnished view of management practice at
the club. In particular, Jonker's descriptions of manager Arsène
Wenger's approach to management don't necessarily line up with
widespread notions about how the club is run.
The conventional
wisdom has long held that Wenger is a micro-manager, someone who must
control every aspect of the club's business from transfer negotiations
to players' diets to the design of facilities. This is the theory Alex
Fynn and Kevin Whitcher advanced forcefully in their 2009 book "Arsènal:
The Making of a Modern Superclub." It also flows from the popular
tendency to equate football clubs with their managers. (See "Arsenal, Arsène Wenger, and the Cult of Personality" for my critique of this line of thinking.)
Perhaps
Wenger has mellowed in recent years; it's also possible the original
portrayal was too stark. Whatever the case, Jonker's interview suggests
that Wenger's style is not autocratic and in many ways conforms to
models of successful leadership.
The manager's level of involvement
Jonker
describes his interactions with Wenger in ways that will seem familiar
to anyone who has ever worked for someone else. "Almost every day,
Wenger and I go through a number of things," said Jonker. "He is
approachable, but I do have to show him what we are doing. We must not
go behind his back."
This seems like a reasonable, open-door approach to management.
"What
I do see," Jonker continued. "is that everybody at the club has the
feeling that they need to have the green light from Wenger before they
do anything."
Now, if "everybody at the club," including Chief
Executive Officer Ivan Gazidis and the stewards at Emirates Stadium,
seeks Wenger's approval, then that's not a functional arrangement. I'm
more inclined to think, however, that Jonker is referring Wenger's
involvement with the football staff, which is a different and more
understandable proposition.
It's not unusual for managers to
expect those reporting to them to produce recommendations for their
response and approval. This is a standard approach in many organizations
and a sensible one in the case of Arsenal.
After all, Wenger is
accountable to Gazidis, the club's board, its supporters, and the media,
so he should know about and support the actions of his staff. How could
he appear before any of those constituents and endorse the sporting
direction if he had not understood and supported the original course of
action?
Foundations in management theory
This
pattern of manager-staff communication falls within what management
theorists call "transactional leadership." This facet of leadership
focuses on exchanges between leaders and followers; managers who want
their staff to provide specific things give those staff members other
things that they want in return. (The original idea comes from Karl
Kuhnert and Philip Lewis, "Transactional and transformational
leadership: A constructive developmental analysis," in Academy of Management Review 10 (1995).)
Wenger
seems to be practicing "active" management in the sense that he
monitors his staff's behavior, anticipates problems, and creates
opportunities to intervene before the problems get worse. (For the
details of "active" vs. "passive" management, see Jane Howell and Bruce
Avolio, "Transformational leadership, transactional leadership, local of
control, and support of innovation: Key predictors of consolidated
business-unit performance," in Journal of Applied Psychology 78 (1993).)
These
behaviors and actions, which amount to exchanges between leaders and
staff members, complement other defining characteristics of what's
called transformational leadership. These higher-level traits and
activities take the form of:
- Charisma that appeals to followers on an emotional level
- Inspirational motivation that articulates a clear and attractive vision
- Intellectual stimulation that challenges assumptions, takes risks, and solicits followers' ideas
- Individualized consideration that results in mentorship and attention to followers' needs
These
are the four dimensions of transformational leadership described by
Timothy Judge and Ronald Piccolo in "Transformational leadership: A
meta-analytic test of their relative validity," in the Journal of Applied Psychology 89 (2004) and examined for their correlations with positive performance outcomes.
Wenger as "transformational leader"
Without
sinking too deep into the academic theory and language, we can use the
four dimensions of transformational leadership to understand how any
manager's behaviors and actions create conditions for top performance.
In the case of Wenger, we can break down his contributions as follows:
Charisma.
Before and after the FA Cup victory in May, current players talked
about how much they wanted to win this trophy for Wenger. Many former
players came out with impassioned support as well. This is just a
recent, prominent episode suggesting that Wenger has built an emotional
appeal among many of those who work for him.
Inspirational motivation.
The vision of attractive, offense-minded football appeals to many both
inside and outside the club. Wenger also displays the optimism that this
approach will succeed in the long run, another aspect of inspirational
motivation.
Intellectual stimulation. It's fair to say that Wenger challenges assumptions and takes risks, as I recently pointed out in "Arsène Wenger's Risk Tolerance."
He allows players considerable autonomy on the pitch. Questions
persist, however, about his willingness to entertain other ideas. So we
should refrain from making a definitive statement about how well Wenger
fulfills this dimension.
Individualized consideration. If
you listen to experienced players such as Mikel Arteta and Tomas
Rosicky, Wenger emerges as a mentor and model they may follow when their
playing careers end. And one of the criticisms levied at the manager is
that he responds too much to what players need, granting their wishes
to leave Arsenal for more playing time elsewhere, for example. That's
definitely an indication of individualized consideration.
This
admittedly superficial review does suggest that Wenger fulfills many
expectations of the transformational leader. It's hard to conclude that
he is not, given that he has guided the sporting side of the club during
an 18-year period characterized by significant, and in many ways
positive, change.
One last test of Wenger's leadership ability remains: What will happen when he departs the scene?
As the Chelsea defeat came to a close on Sunday, I thought, "That's just great. We've got two weeks to dwell on this."
The
second international break of the season affords fans and pundits 13
days--until the visit of Hull City on October 18--to pore over what went
wrong at Stamford Bridge. Thanks to social media, blogs, and podcasts,
we also have the means to linger over and discuss the squad's
shortcomings.
Expect plenty of moaning and armchair expertise.
The professionals weigh in
Fortunately,
the professionals see no value in wallowing in defeat. The post-match
comments of Jack Wilshere and Per Mertesaker showed a constructive,
mature perspective.
The occasionally temperamental Wilshere observed to Arsenal Player,
"That's the difference at this level. You're playing against teams who,
when you're on top, you have to make it count; otherwise, they'll
punish you. And they did."
With a similarly matter-of-fact tone, Mertesaker, the team captain on the day, told Sky Sports, "We have to admit they are better than us--still better--and we have to learn quickly."
This conclusion suggested the squad will take a series of next steps, consisting of:
- Analyzing the performance
- Avoiding paralysis and blame over mistakes and failures
- Applying what the group learned from the analysis
- Turning attention to the Hull match
Or, as manager Arsène Wenger put it, "They won. Congratulations to them. And let's go to the next game."
The cold, clear light of day
Assessing
the performance soberly and focusing quickly on the next objective do
not necessarily appeal to many supporters. They're more comfortable with
a prolonged emotional reaction, for several reasons:
- They can only view the last match and not the process of preparing for the next one
- They experience an ongoing flood of information about that last match
- They're subjected to taunts by opposing fans and even fellow Arsenal supporters
- They can't call on the refined psychological traits and techniques available to elite athletes
I wrote recently about this psychological edge in "Mesut Özil Plays for Arsenal, and You Do Not,"
and the ability to react to setbacks constructively strikes me as
another expert adaptation to the stress associated with high-level
competition. It contributes to a mental framework that permits optimal
physical performance.
"When our brains get caught up in thoughts
from the past, or thoughts of the future, it creates a stress response,
and we can’t use the part of the brain that keeps us engaged in the
moment," Kirsten Race, Ph. D., an expert on psychological awareness, has
said. In other words, there's a neurological reason for Arsenal's
players to place the Chelsea result in its proper context: Their brains
won't be fully geared to succeed in their next match if they're mulling
their last one.
In previous seasons, Wenger praised his team's
resilience, which has always been, like anything psychological, a work
in progress. The hesitant performances after last season's high-profile
disasters suggested that Arsenal team had not evolved mentally to the
best effect.
We will see when Hull City visits the Emirates on
October 18 how the current group of Arsenal players copes with its first
major setback of the season. The good news is, Sunday's 2-0 loss wasn't
debilitating, and public statements by the players and manager point to
a healthy attitude. That's a better position than many supporters
occupy at the moment.
During Arsenal manager Arsène Wenger's press conferences after the
North London Derby and before the Galatasaray Champions League match,
assembled media asked at least 25 questions. Only one of those questions
sought the manager's perspective on a newsworthy item from the 1-1 draw
with Tottenham: Why was star signing Alexis Sanchez not in the starting
lineup?
Wenger's response was brief. "It was the selection of the day," he said. Was there any medical reason? "No, no, no, no."
That
was it on the subject. No one probed the rationale for excluding the
£30-million-plus summer acquisition, source of the club's second highest
transfer fee, who had already scored four goals for Arsenal account.
James McNicholas (@Gunnerblog) raised this question and offered some potential reasons in his ESPN FC blog post "Sanchez Error Tops the List of Questions to Ask Wenger."
I'm drawn to a related but broader question, "How do you weigh the risk
tradeoffs when you structure and select a starting XI?"
This
strikes me as a legitimate and germane line of inquiry. Legitimate
because, unlike transfer dealings, injuries, finances, and many other
issues, the matchday construction of the team falls entirely within the
manager's control; that's his core responsibility. It's a germane
question because the team soon goes to Chelsea, site of last season's
tactical disaster and mauling.
Deliberating risks in the tactical system
The
experience at Chelsea, Liverpool, and Everton and continued signs of
vulnerability to counterattacks should be provoking serious
deliberations among the Arsenal manager and his assistants. In
particular, they should be weighing the risks of sending both fullbacks
into the attacking half of the field against the downsides of
instructing them to remain in defensive territory.
More astute and
experienced tactical observers than I have noted that Wenger has chosen
the more assertive approach for years. It's still worth asking whether
the benefits of extra players at the offensive end, such as the
potential of outnumbering the opposition on the flanks, warrant the
consistent and therefore predictable forward presence of Arsenal
fullbacks. Against some opponents, those advantages are probably worth
the risk; against speedy and precise opposition, perhaps not.
Assessing drawbacks to subtle structural changes
A second major tactical risk grows out of the new 4-1-4-1 formation. My colleague Michael Price has argued convincingly in "A Look at Arsenal's Move to the 4-1-4-1"
that this change is a response to the pressing and counterattacking
that overwhelmed Arsenal in away games against top opposition last
season.
The 4-1-4-1 setup could mitigate that risk in the long run as it
allows Arsenal players to close down the opposition more quickly.
However, it's not a comfortable or fully formed system yet, so for the
moment it heightens the risk that the defense will be overrun,
particularly if the fullbacks' forays forward continue.
The
manager has said that the formation represents only a subtle shift, and
indeed it morphed comfortably and successfully into a 4-2-3-1 in the
wins against Aston Villa and Galatasaray. In some ways, though, the
subtlety only heightens the risk. That's because the players have to
understand and execute the approach at a fine level of nuance. These
mental and physical demands come on the heels of a World Cup, which
taxed most of Arsenal's first team and shortened the period to hone this
new approach.
Given that the 2013-14 system produced 79 points
and an FA Cup, it's reasonable to ask whether the risks of the new
system are worth taking on.
Balancing risks in team selection
The personnel available to the manager, even in light of multiple injuries, creates another series of risk tradeoffs.
The
threats of being outnumbered in midfield and the defensive zone could,
for example, be dealt with by moving the wide forwards closer to the
back line, which is an approach we saw late in the 2012-13 season and
early in the 2013-14 campaign. The risks in that are passivity and
ceding possession, but the speed of new players Sanchez and Danny
Welbeck and the returning Theo Walcott would worry the opposition even
if it does control the ball.
Let's accept, though, that Wenger
prefers a more proactive approach, and his knowledge, success, and
teams' flair make me hesitate to question that philosophy. What I would
nevertheless ask about is the omission of Sanchez from the starting XI,
especially given the objectives of the evolving system. If the 4-1-4-1
seeks to follow Pep Guardiola's Bayern Munich and its coordinated
pressing, doesn't Sanchez seem the perfect player to harry the
opposition from a wide forward position?
Perhaps the balance
Wenger was trying to strike against Tottenham was between what his team
did with the ball and what it did without it. As Tim Stillman (@LittleDutchVA) observed in his weekly column
for Arseblog last week, Sanchez attempts daring moves that often result
in losing the ball. If the manager is prioritizing ball retention over
offensive creativity, then that's a case for leaving Sanchez on the
bench. It's also a reason to leave out Jack Wilshere in favor of Santi
Cazorla in midfield, but Wilshere got the start against Tottenham.
These
decisions have faded from view after the team's exhilarating
performance against Galatasaray. That game -- and the role Sanchez
played in it -- makes a compelling argument that his playing style
represents a risk worth bearing. Otherwise, we'd have to entertain the
possibility that the club spent more than £30 million on a player before
its manager reached the conclusion that his style is too cavalier. That
seems like an even more worrying proposition.